1. What is your definition of
science and of religion?
The question implies that science and religion cannot be defined with
proximate genus and specific difference. How could we, who are dependent on
religion and surrounded by the world of science, define the perimeters of
science and religion? Naturally, we provide a description of science and
religion. Some of the contemporary researchers are of the opinion that our
understanding and comprehension is a function of the world in which we live, and
that this world has paradigms and measures which guide science. I do not mean we
do not know science and religion. Understanding is one thing and describing is
something else. Of course, if we are able to describe something, undoubtedly we
know it. But, first, we do not know everything through descriptions. Second, the
highest form of knowledge is about things that cannot be described such as God,
truth and justice.
But there are people who are aware of God and those are supporters of truth
and justice. Any man of religion is familiar with religion. Any man of science
is dealing with science. But neither the man of religion nor the man of science
know all of religion or science, and, hence, they are unable to define science
or religion (and of course, if they are not philosophers, they would not even
decide to define science and religion). This difficulty arises more often in the
case of religion, because science is related to reason. But reason is not able
to understand the depth and mystery of religion, even though religion itself is
not alien to reason. It is clear that here we are not referring to science in
its wider sense. What is meant here is a science through which the modern world
has been distinguished from other worlds, and its precise example is found in
mathematical physics. The positivists viewed this science as expressing constant
and necessary relations among the phenomena.
In the neo-positivism, it was insisted that science is not a collection of
propositions or theories whose correctness is confirmed or proven by experience.
The first statement has the added advantage that indirectly it points out to the
fact that science had an order. But the second statement is mostly the
description of the work that the scientist does. Perhaps Feyerabend had this in
mind when he said-and in his opinion one cannot put it any better than this-that
science is that which the scientist does. One can find fissures in these
so-called definitions. For example, one can ask whether the constant relations
among the phenomena are external relations, and that science recognizes the
things and relations as they are, or as Kant used to say, these relations derive
their constancy and necessity from the human understanding. If through science
one can understand the phenomena of nature, the understanding of each phenomenon
depends on our faculty of perception. A phenomenon does not have an independent
being. But when some say that science is composed of propositions which are
either proved or refuted by experiment, they still have not defined science, but
have tried to describe the features of a scientific proposition.
However, is it not true that if we know the description and nature of the
statements and propositions of a science, then we know that science? But here
the question does not revolve around the nature of the problem, but around the
way in which the problems are proven or refuted. In effect, it would be as if it
were said that science is a collection of propositions which can render
themselves to scientific investigation. Let us assume that we know the
description of scientific propositions. For example, we accept that there are
statements and propositions that are proven by experience, and scientific
judgments are among these types. In this case, have we found the essence of
science? This is not a description of science; it is a brief account of a
viewpoint and philosophical perception of science. What should be stressed here
is that there is no common feature in the two aforementioned statements. But,
how would it be possible then to define, with one or two statements, two things
that do not mean the same thing and are not convertible to each other?
In the first statement, science or scientific judgment has been described on
the basis of its subject matter, whereas in the second description, the subject
matter and object of science have been completely ignored and the focus has been
on the method and form. But a more difficult question in the second description
is: Where does theory come from, and how is it constructed, and if the theory is
not derived from experience, how can experience be the measure for the truth or
falsity of scientific judgments? Can science have a measure outside of itself, a
measure which would not be in the same category as science? Of course, method is
very important in science. It is so important that one could say that science is
investigation, and investigation is applying a design on beings based on method.
As we see in this definition, the status of technique in the nature of science
has been duly recognized. However, we should not consider it as a definition of
science. We cannot define science. There are plenty of ambiguities and
differences of opinion regarding the source, conditions, possibilities,
exigencies and effects of science, as well as on the relationship between
science, history, culture and metaphysics. How can one define science if it does
not have a beginning, and its beginning dates back to man's prehistory, and its
end cannot be predicted? Essentially the question about the nature of science is
one which belongs to the domain of philosophy and in each philosophy a
manifestation of science appears. Hence, it is possible that someone would say
that science is the same as quantification, and still someone else might call
science [a way of] forecasting.
It is possible that some experts would regard science as true because it
fulfils our demands and needs. In the language of religion and metaphysics,
science is defined in a different manner. For example, it is possible to say
that science is among the manifestations of the majesty of the Lord, and, amazes
man. Because the path to the Sacred passes through [the realm of] amazement,
perhaps through science man can reach the Sacred dimension. The great
philosopher of the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra, considered science as a manner of
existence. He viewed science as possessing analogical gradation. When anyone of
us speaks of science, we intend a certain stage of it, and one cannot understand
the truth and the stage without referring to the totality. If we are supposed to
define particular science, this definition must be with a view to general
science. Since in the contemporary philosophy of science, universal science is
not discussed, it would be difficult and baseless to define science.
Now we must define religion. If science does not have a definition, how can
one define religion? Religion is love. It is submission. It is servitude [to
God]. It is submission [to the will of God]. It is a covenant. These are all
true. But this is still not a definition. If we review, and describe, the
religious statements and actions of the man of religion, we still cannot
consider it a description of religion. Anthropologists, sociologists,
psychologists and philosophers usually look at religion from outside. Each is
trying in a special way to come up with general definitions of religion. It can
be summarized, from what has been said in different disciplines that religion is
belief in the Sacred, acting on the basis of religious decrees and required
rites. But the difficulty is in understanding the meaning of the belief,
especially the belief in the Sacred.
What is the Sacred? How do we understand the Sacred and the Transcendent and
how do we believe in them? For instance, the understanding of the one who sees
religion rooted in man's fear is quite different from that of the person who
views man as a being who is by nature religious. Before defining religion, we
must know what relations there are between man and religion. If man is connected
as much with religion as he is with irreligion, and this relation has come about
by accident, in effect these are two independent entities, and while man
examines religion from the outside, he can understand religion to a degree. But
if man's nature is mixed with religion, in that case, in the understanding of
religion, the believer himself is involved as well; one cannot look at religion
divorced from the outside world and in a vacuum. For the moment, I decide
against getting involved in these debates. What I want to say is that man became
man with the Covenant he made in time immemorial. The beginning of religion
starts with the Covenant of the past. Whatever religion encompasses-laws,
decrees, its decrees on what is prohibited or permissible, its rites and
rituals-are the result of that Covenant.
But we have to be careful not to view this Covenant as a covenant between two
independent entities. This is a special Covenant. We were asked, while we were
only a potentiality, "Am I Not Your Lord?" and we responded positively to the
question in the language of our potentiality. With this response, we became a
human being, and carried the burden of that which has been entrusted to us. The
emergence of man, the advent of religion and belief in religion was indeed an
event. Man became man after he made a Covenant, and his Covenant was of a
religious nature. Some say that if religion had been innate in man, then all of
the people would have been religious, and no one could have been able to reject
religion. These people do not understand that religion is a covenant and it is
possible that one would forget or break a covenant, in which case they are
covenant-breakers. With this statement, we have indeed admitted that religion
does not belong to us; we have admitted that it is we who belong to religion,
and how can a component of an entity define the entity to which it belongs?
2. Do you see any conflict between your definitions
of these two concepts?
When providing a description, hardly any conflict arises between religion and
science, and if there is a conflict, it is in the sub-principles and
conclusions. In fact, there is no conflict between science and religion. No
scientist can deny the existence of the sacred source by resorting to science,
and view worshipping as a futile act. But sometimes there is a conflict between
scientific research and religious absolutes. Earlier thinkers used to say that
if a conflict arises between the dictates of reason and the religious decrees,
one must interpret the religious decree. This perception, especially in the past
two centuries, has led to the interpretation of the religious statements in
harmony with the universally accepted scientific facts.
For example, some of the researchers and even some of the jurisprudents have
adjusted the account of the creation of man to the evolution theory. Perhaps
these attempts are not that significant but they are not without justification
either. If they view the language of religion and science as one, and if they
divide the religious decrees to descriptive and prescriptive decrees, and view
its descriptive decrees of the same type as the descriptive scientific
propositions and subject to investigation based on the scientific method, they
would have no choice but to take the side of science in case there emerges a
conflict between science and religion. This is due to the fact that from the
beginning they have understood the language of religion as similar to the
language of science and have scientifically approached religion, If our
yardstick is the language of science and scientific theories, and religious
statement has to be interpreted such that it would go along with science, still
the language of religion would be different from the language of science: The
religious statement, once interpreted, does not mean the same thing as what it
seems to say. If it were so, would there be any need for analogy and
interpretation?
If we look closer, we realize that there is no conflict between science and
religion. Actually, the conflict is between the theologians and scholars or
between theology and some parts of the scientific theories or a specific
interpretation of these theories. However, in educational textbooks or the like,
and in the opinion of those who limit scientific judgments to investigation,
research, refutation and proof or testability, and contend that scientific
judgments could be either confirmed or approved, or investigated and refuted,
either deliberately or unconsciously, they have created a confrontation between
religion and science. Especially when having meaning would mean that it is
testable (the view held by most members of the Vienna Circle), one cannot test
and investigate a religious decree in the same manner that one would with
routine scientific hypotheses and theories (of course, grand scientific
theories, too, are not provable or refutable in their totality).
The point that needs to be considered here is the meaning of experiment and
investigation. If we intend the general meaning of experiment, undoubtedly it
would include religious, moral and mystical experiments. Hence, it could no
longer be considered a characteristic exclusive to science and scientific
research. But the statement that decrees are meaningful only when they can be
investigated through scientific methods cannot be supported and the men of
science reject such statements. Hence, if someone says that the definition of
science is in conflict with the definition of religion, he can hardly justify
his own words.
3. Where do you think there may be a conflict
between these two?
The way is paved for the emergence of conflict whenever and wherever they
want to evaluate religious decrees with scientific measures, and especially view
its language of allusion as identical with the quantitative language of
sciences. But if the boundaries are clearly recognized, the belief in the
religious principles and exigencies would never hinder scientific investigation
anywhere. But sometimes some of these dependencies create or destroy the context
for doing scientific research. However, whatever is not considered as
preconditions for scientific research and does not pave the way for it, is not
opposed to science.
4. What have been the grounds for the development of
conflict between these two?
In the past periods, there was no contradiction between science and religion.
The conflict between reason and religion has been discussed since the time of
Plato. From the beginning of the Hellenistic era and Alexandrian period, this
conflict was intensified somewhat. Muslim philosophers and theologians from the
Christian era tried to somehow resolve this conflict. The result of the efforts
by Muslim philosophers and researchers such as Khwaja Nassir-al-Din Tusi and
Fayyaz Lahiji is that reason and religion are not at all opposed to each other.
If some of the mystics denigrated science, they were referring to a science
which serves as a veil.
5. What has been the role of religion in the
development of science in the West?
The people of Iran and those in the regions considered the Islamic lands were
able to learn the sciences of the Greeks, Chinese and Indians before accepting
Islam. But as we know, they did not show any interest or desire [to learn these
sciences]. But with the expansion of Islam, the interest in science grew.
Seekers of knowledge traveled from remote regions in order to learn sciences. In
less than 80 years, sciences such as medicine, astronomy, mathematics, alchemy
and philosophy arrived in the world of Islam from India and Greece. Despite the
perception common among some historians of science, the sciences of the Islamic
era did not have a stillbirth. Rather, they were like dynamic newborns who grew
to their maturity. But, it would not be appropriate or right to compare the
growth and vitality of the sciences of the Islamic era with those of the
Renaissance period in Europe.
6. Can we have a religious science?
One understands two things from the term "religious science". One is a
science which is about religious questions and discussions. The other is a
science which has acquired religious characteristics, even though it is not
necessarily connected with religion and is separate from religion. Undoubtedly,
the second type of science is intended when it is asked whether it is possible
to have religious science. If we approach the issue from an abstract
perspective, we realize that logic, mathematics, physics and sociology would not
become religious sciences, and there is no need to make them religious, and it
is possible to say that speaking of Islamic physics and geometry would be
meaningless.
These statements, as has been stated before, are generally understood to
imply that a person has only engaged in an exercise of futility if he decides to
make mechanics and astronomy Christian or Islamic. In whatever world the
sciences are, they acquire the characteristics of that world. They also rotate
around the axis, as well as serve the interests, of that world. As far as we
know, the only non-religious world in the history of man is the modern Western
world. The non-religious thought and science began in Greece. The Greek world
was non-religious and their science, too was non-religious. But if the modern
non-religious world would be transformed to a relig- ious world, i.e. this world
would vanish and a new world would emerge for which religious thought would
serve as the backbone, then science, too, would be under the shade of religion,
and would become religious in a sense.
7. Can science dispense with religion?
Apparently, science can be independent from religion because the fundamentals
of science are not the same as the principles and fundamentals of religion, and
scientific judgments are rarely mistaken for religious decrees. Not only the
modern science is independent from religion, but also the science of
perspectives, astronomy, mathematics and mechanics of the earlier people were
not religious and would not have any relations to religiosity. But one could
discuss the issue in a different way. One could imagine that if man had not had
any religion, would science have evolved to become what it is today? Would
science have been possible at all? We do not know what man would have been if
there had been no religion. Man became man with the Covenant, and if this
Covenant had not been there, man would not have become possessor of science,
technique, ethics and politics. It might be said that this statement contradicts
what have been considered established facts, because millennia of growth and
development of science in the religious contexts are not comparable with the
200-year or 300-year growth of science in the modern non-religious world. It is
true that the modern world is non-religious but this world follows a religious
world.
In the modern world, pseudo-religious interests have taken the place of
religious interests. The existence of this world depends in many ways on
religion and religious beliefs. Modern science too, has roots in metaphysics and
religious thought. I do not want to dwell on what has been said about the
Christian foundation of modern civilization and science. Suffice it to say that
if religion had not been there, we would not have known about truth. The
dependence of science on truth is of the same type as the religious quest.
Actually, science has borrowed the concept of truth from religion and has given
it another meaning. Even though science, in its abstract form, is independent
from religion, when all the conditions for emergence of science are considered,
then we realize that it is connected with religion.
8. Can one separate the domains of activity of
science and religion completely?
Based on what has been said in the seventh question, the domains of science
and religion are in one sense independent from each other. But if we consider it
with a view to unity, both are rooted in the same source.